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Banking & financial services

Migration guidance for banks and financial services teams preparing hybrid TLS, key custody, and cryptographic inventory work.

Abstract hybrid TLS gateway connecting legacy services to protected infrastructure segments.
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Section TLS migration on customer-facing endpoints Financial institutions operate thousands of customer-facing HTTPS endpoints — online banking portals, payment APIs, mobile app back-ends, and partner-integration gateways. Each of these endpoints... Section Engagement deliverables TLS endpoint inventory covering customer portals, payment APIs, mobile back ends, and partner gateways. Client-compatibility plan that separates hybrid rollout, legacy fallback, and final... Section SWIFT-grade signing chains and inter-bank messaging Inter-bank message signing uses RSA or ECDSA signature chains today. Under Shor’s algorithm, both are broken retroactively: a message archive signed with ECDSA-P256 and... Section Regulatory alignment: PSD2, DORA, and FFIEC The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), effective January 2025 for EU financial entities, requires ICT risk management frameworks that address emerging threats including cryptographic... Section Harvest risk for long-retention financial records Payment transaction records, credit files, and customer account histories are retained for 7 to 10 years under anti-money-laundering and consumer-protection regulations. Records encrypted today...
Banking

Quantum-safe signing and TLS for financial infrastructure.

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TLS migration on customer-facing endpoints

Financial institutions operate thousands of customer-facing HTTPS endpoints — online banking portals, payment APIs, mobile app back-ends, and partner-integration gateways. Each of these endpoints terminates a TLS session whose key exchange today relies on ECDH or RSA. Quanten’s hybrid TLS migration replaces those handshakes with the same ECDH-P384 + ML-KEM-1024 profile used across the platform, or with ML-KEM-1024 standalone mode where client-device compatibility allows. The migration is transparent to application code: it happens at the TLS termination layer, requiring no changes to the business logic sitting behind the load balancer.

Rollout follows a graduated traffic-shaping approach. PQC-capable clients negotiate the new handshake; legacy clients fall back to classical TLS without interruption. The traffic split is tracked through structured negotiation-event logs exported to the SIEM, giving the security team a real-time view of how quickly the client population is migrating without any manual instrumentation of the application layer.

Engagement deliverables

  • TLS endpoint inventory covering customer portals, payment APIs, mobile back ends, and partner gateways.
  • Client-compatibility plan that separates hybrid rollout, legacy fallback, and final cutover criteria.
  • DORA-aligned evidence pack with algorithm identifiers, migration dates, and residual-risk notes.

SWIFT-grade signing chains and inter-bank messaging

Inter-bank message signing uses RSA or ECDSA signature chains today. Under Shor’s algorithm, both are broken retroactively: a message archive signed with ECDSA-P256 and retained for ten years will be forgeable once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrives. Quanten replaces the signing layer with ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) operating in dual-signature mode during the transition period, co-signing each message with both the legacy and post-quantum algorithm so counterparties can verify with whichever they support. Full cutover to ML-DSA-87 alone follows when counterparty readiness is confirmed.

  • ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) dual-signature bridge mode
  • ECDH-P384 + ML-KEM-1024 hybrid TLS for customer endpoints
  • Negotiation-event logging to SIEM with algorithm identifiers
  • Legacy client fallback with zero application-layer changes

Regulatory alignment: PSD2, DORA, and FFIEC

The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), effective January 2025 for EU financial entities, requires ICT risk management frameworks that address emerging threats including cryptographic obsolescence. The FFIEC’s cybersecurity guidelines in the United States increasingly reference NIST’s PQC transition guidance. PSD2 strong customer authentication requirements, while not PQC-specific, depend on signature schemes whose long-term integrity is threatened by the same quantum timeline.

Quanten maps each migration workstream to the relevant regulatory control, producing attestation artefacts that document the algorithm in use, the migration timeline, and the residual risk during the transition window. These artefacts support both internal audit and external regulatory examination. Talk to our security team to review how your current cryptographic estate aligns with DORA ICT risk requirements.

Harvest risk for long-retention financial records

Payment transaction records, credit files, and customer account histories are retained for 7 to 10 years under anti-money-laundering and consumer-protection regulations. Records encrypted today under RSA-2048 or AES-128 with ECDH-derived keys are already at harvest risk: nation-state adversaries collecting TLS sessions at internet exchange points are building archives that will become readable once a CRQC is available. Under a 2029–2033 planning scenario, records encrypted today may still be within retention period when decryption capability arrives. Quanten’s financial sector engagement includes a long-retention data risk assessment, identifying which record classes are most exposed and prioritising re-encryption or key rotation to PQC-protected envelopes.